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ABSTRACT
The importance of the central bank and the government conduct-
ing their policies has increased recently, with more attention
being given to the effectiveness of policy mix. The non-coopera-
tive models of the monetary and fiscal game are frequently
employed to study interactions between both authorities. The
models assume that the authorities take into account each other’s
choices when making decisions. It is also important to remember
when seeking equilibrium in the non-cooperative models that in
the Nash Equilibrium (which is sought in this study) the parties
try to come up with the best response to the opponent’s deci-
sion. The aim of the paper is to present the Nash Equilibrium in a
non-cooperative game between the government and the central
bank using a non-cooperative model of a fiscal-monetary game (a
policy-mix MODEL). This study demonstrates that in the Nash
Equilibrium in the model, the budget deficit and interest rate of
an EU member state depend on the exogenous data (external to
the model), such as inflation target, base inflation and the
Maastricht deficit limit. This study is enhanced by an analysis of
the government and central bank’s sensitivity to the deep param-
eters of economic variables.
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1. Introduction
The interactions between the government’s fiscal policy and the central bank’s monet-
ary policy influence the economy of a country. The combination of these policies is
known in the economic literature as a ’policy-mix’. When studying the interactions
between the central bank and the government’s policies, one must bear in mind that
the authorities’ goals are different in many respects and sometimes even conflict with
each other, which leads to coordination problems.
The monetary and fiscal policies are designed to stabilise economic activity and
ensure sustainable development in the country by protecting price stability in the
case of the monetary policy and supporting full employment or high economic
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growth in the case of the fiscal policy. These different goals explain why the govern-
ment and the central bank have a problem coordinating their decisions, or why such
coordination does not occur at all.
There have been numerous comprehensive studies examining the implications of
potential conflicts between monetary and fiscal policies, as well as the benefits of
coordinating them. Many of these studies are based on the game theory approach
and models assuming a specific level of cooperation between the central bank and the
government, which influence each other’s behaviour by their decisions.
The paper aims to find the Nash Equilibrium with respect to a non-cooperative
game between both these authorities. We propose using the non-cooperative game to
examine the issue of coordination of fiscal and monetary policies in the EU member
state. An original policy-mix model is constructed for a non-cooperative game taking
account of specific constraints resulting from the behaviour of the two authorities as
well as institutional limitations imposed by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability
and Growth Pact. This paper presents the reaction functions of the central bank and
the government, which are different from those mentioned in the literature. Based on
these, the Nash Equilibrium was calculated when designing the original equilibrium
model for a non-cooperative monetary-fiscal game in the EU countries. Moreover,
contrary to a generally applied approach based on discrete strategies, continuous
strategies1 were used in this equilibrium model, which additionally contributes
strongly to the economic literature. The sensitivity of the government and the central
bank to changes in the so-called deep parameters2 of economic variables is also ana-
lysed. Parameters ~a1, ~a2, ~a3, ~b1, ~b2 and ~b3 - which are the non-linear combination of
deep parameters – measure how strongly a given variable influences the optimal deci-
sion of the government or of the central bank.
It must be noted that the analysis of sensitivity conducted in this paper is an ori-
ginal study based on an original equilibrium model for a non-cooperative monetary-
fiscal game in the EU countries. There is an apparent need to determine the level of
the Nash Equilibrium for a non-cooperative fiscal-monetary game because few studies
have used the mathematical models of policy mix thus far, especially with respect to
the EU countries facing institutional restrictions, such as the Maastricht criteria, and
due to the advancing economic integration of the EU. According to the authors, the
Nash Equilibrium in the non-cooperative game model with institutional restrictions
has not yet been thoroughly analysed.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the findings of a review
of studies on the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies in the context of the
game theory. In Section 3 our model of a non-cooperative game between the central
bank and the government is introduced. The section also explains the model’s
assumptions and different variants of the Nash Equilibrium and provides a sensitivity
analysis. The last section presents the conclusions.
2. The game theory framework for analysing policy mix coordination
in the context of a non-cooperative game
Studies on policy mix have been conducted by researchers such as Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2000), Buti (2003), Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2006), Flanagan, Uyarra,
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and Laranja (2011), Badarau and Levieuge (2011), Saulo, Rego, and Divino (2013)
and Cui (2016), all of whom found the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies
to be beneficial. Special problems with coordinating policy mix are observed in the
Euro area countries (Carlberg, 2012; Jacquet & Pisani-Ferry, 2007). Their fiscal poli-
cies influence national inflation, which has an effect on average inflation in the Euro
area and consequently the ECB’s decisions about common monetary policy. It should
be noted, however, that the governments of the EU member states have limited free-
dom in designing their fiscal policies because of the limitations imposed by the
Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2007) and the
Stability and Growth Pact (1997). There is also the question about the degree to
which the ECB’s common monetary policy influences each member of the Euro area
and about the policy’s implications for national fiscal policies. The implications are
certainly not the same because of structural differences between countries and
because the Euro-zone as a whole fails to meet the conditions of an optimum cur-
rency area.
According to Sargent and Wallace (1981) ’unpleasant monetarist arithmetic’, in an
expansionary fiscal policy environment with chronic budget deficits, the monetary
authority cannot maintain control over inflation in the longer term regardless of its
strategy. In other words, the central bank’s monetary policy can be affected by a fiscal
policy, which may lead to problems with stabilising prices (Sargent & Wallace, 1981).
Stabilising an economy in the short term is problematic because the central bank and
the government have different goals or preferences. To be optimally effective, both
authorities should coordinate their actions and decisions (Bhattacharya & Kudoh,
2002; Buiter & Panigirtzoglou, 1999), but the central bank’s pursuit of stable prices is
disturbed in the long term by various factors hindering the coordination of fiscal and
monetary policies (Bhattacharya, Guzman, & Smith, 1998; van Aarle, Bovenberg, &
Raith, 1995).
In examining the monetary-fiscal interactions and their implications, models con-
structed in the game theory framework are useful (Bennett & Loayza, 2000; Libich &
Stehlik, 2010). The game theory is increasingly used to study monetary and fiscal
interactions. This article contributes to this area of research - with an additional focus
on non-cooperative games. Considering that there may be a conflict of interest
between the creators of the monetary and fiscal policies of a given country, to model
these and similar potential conflicts between economic authorities, the game theory -
a valuable analytical tool - should be used. Several macroeconomic policy applications
can be found in the economic literature (Arora, 2012; Basar & Olsder, 1999; Neck &
Behrens, 2003, 2009).
An analysis of these models shows that the coordination of fiscal and monetary
policies supports the economy (Blake & Weale, 1998; Demertzis, Hughes, Hallet, &
Viegi, 2002; Dixit & Lambertini, 2003) by reducing the risk of frictions, helps minim-
ise the price stability costs and ensures greater stability of the financial system
(Benassy, 2004; Chadha & Nolan, 2007; Sargent & Wallace, 1981). The models also
provide insight into the mechanism of conflicts between the central bank and the
government; an expansionary fiscal policy frequently leads to the tightening of the
monetary policy (Bennet & Loayza, 2000), while an overly restrictive monetary policy
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may increase the cost of disinflation and the government’s cost of fiscal policy, miti-
gating the impacts of disinflation (Wyplosz, 2002).
Game theory has been successfully employed by Pohjola (1986), Osborne and
Rubinstein (1994), Camerer (2003), Osborne (2003), Canzoneri et al. (2006), Saulo
et al. (2013) and Cui (2016) to study the interactions between monetary and fiscal
policies. The assumption adopted by these and other authors is that a central bank
seeks to keep inflation on target and prices stable, while the government’s fiscal deci-
sions are to ensure a high rate of economic growth or employment. In pursuing their
goals, both authorities adjust their actions to their partner’s choices (Dixit &
Lambertini, 2000).
Each authority’s preferences can be represented by an objective function that is
optimised for selected constraints. In order to determine each authority’s optimal
behaviour, the so-called reaction function is constructed, which shows the likely
response of one authority to a specific decision made by its partner. The reaction
functions allow for identifying the level of equilibrium, called the Nash Equilibrium
(Bennett & Loayza, 2000; Cechetti, 2000; Kishan & Opiela, 2000; Nash, 1950), where
each authority’s decision is its best answer to the opponent’s choice (Gibbons, 1997).
The above game can be cooperative or non-cooperative. The cooperative game
assumes that both authorities operate in the same macroeconomic circumstances
and optimise their decisions by taking into account what their partner may con-
sider important.
In the non-cooperative game model (Nash, 1951), the government - trying to
maximise its objective function - is faced by restrictions such as budget constraints,
the central bank’s decisions and the macroeconomic conditions that cannot be con-
trolled by either of the players. The central bank - seeking to optimise its decisions
without compromising its main goal, which is keeping prices stable without deviating
from the inflation target - has to deal with constraints such as the government’s deci-
sions, economic circumstances and specific impediments affecting the implementation
of a monetary policy (e.g. a rule of monetary policy) (Chang & Liu, 2018; Davig &
Leeper, 2011; Dixit & Lambertini, 2000, 2003; Gali & Monacelli, 2008; Leith & Wren-
Lewis, 2006).
The non-cooperative models assume that the central bank and the government
may choose not to cooperate for reasons such as different output and inflation tar-
gets, different weights attached to the targets, the adherence to different economic
theories and different views on the fiscal and monetary policies’ effect on the econ-
omy (Darnaut & Kutos, 2005; Hughes Hallett, Libich, & Stehlik, 2014). The non-
cooperative models frequently produce suboptimal results characterised by higher def-
icits and higher real interest rates compared with the cooperative models (Bennet &
Loayza, 2000; Blinder, 1982; Nordhaus, 1994). The non-cooperative game model by
Dixit and Lambertini (2001) produced a similar result, with output and inflation
respectively lower and higher than optimal.
In the Dixit and Lambertini (2000) model, the Nash Equilibrium for non-coordi-
nated monetary and fiscal policies involves higher inflation and lower output com-
pared with the best feasible allocation, which would not be optimal anyway because
of disturbances caused by fiscal policy. This is because of the nature of the conflict
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between the central bank and the government, where the central bank pursues output
and inflation levels lower than those set by the government. As a result, an inflation-
ary fiscal policy is partially offset by an overly-contractionary monetary policy
(Kuttner, 2002).
The Nordhaus (1994) model also assumes that each authority chooses a non-
cooperative behaviour and designs its policy believing that the other authority will
not change its policy. As a result, the budget deficit rises above a level that the
authorities consider acceptable, because the government increases the deficit with the
goal of reducing unemployment, whereas the central bank raises interest rates to fight
inflation. It is for this same reason that interest rates are higher in the non-coopera-
tive equilibrium (Nordhaus, 1994; Vieira, Machado, & Ribeiro, 2018).
In keeping with the Nordhaus (1994) approach, we also investigated a monetary-
fiscal game to find the Nash Equilibrium. In the Nordhaus (1994) study, the implicit
preferences of each player (the central bank and the government) serve as functions
of policy variables. The central bank implements its monetary policy through interest
rates, and the fiscal authority is responsible for the structural fiscal surplus ratio (gov-
ernment surplus at high employment divided by potential gross national product).
The government’s preference function consists of inflation, unemployment, the
growth of potential output and the structural fiscal surplus ratio. For the central
bank, the function includes inflation, unemployment and the growth of potential out-
put. The unemployment rate measuring the utilisation of resources is a function of
the government’s and central bank’s policies and of other predetermined and exogen-
ous variables, such as capital stock, technology and foreign output. The rate can be
replaced by the ratio of actual to potential output.
Dixit and Lambertini (2000) investigated the central bank authority and the gov-
ernment with the assumption that they pursued different goals. To this end, they con-
structed a model of strategic cooperation between both authorities using various loss
functions, which differ in design from our proposal in this paper. Namely, to con-
struct the loss function for the government, they used inflation (the difference
between inflation and the government’s inflation target), the level of output (the dif-
ference between output and the government’s output target) and the parameters of
severe losses related to taxes and/or expenditures. As far as the central bank’s loss
function is concerned, it consisted of inflation (the difference between inflation and
the central bank’s inflation target) and output (the difference between output and the
central bank’s output target).
3. The model – a non-cooperative game
In a non-cooperative game, the players make decisions independently of each other
(see the section above). In our model, the government and the central bank are
autonomous authorities pursuing individual goals. The government is intent on
achieving the highest GDP growth possible, whereas the central bank makes efforts to
keep inflation on target to ensure price stability. Each authority uses different policy
tools to accomplish their goals: the budgetary surplus (or deficit) for the government
and interest rates for the central bank. Because of their different goals, they exert
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different influence on the macroeconomic factors and indirectly influence each other’s
policies.
The main challenge in modelling a non-cooperative game is to optimise the object-
ive function with respect to constraints. The optimisation procedure is explained
step-by-step below.
Let us consider a model of an economy in which fiscal policy and monetary policy
are carried out by the government and the central bank, respectively. Because both
authorities shape their policies based on their partner’s decisions, their behaviours
can be analysed in the game-theory framework. Therefore, the government seeks to
maximise its objective function3:
FFðÞ ¼ g2yf1ðdÞ ¼ g2ya0ðddMÞ2 ! max (1)
subject to following constraint4:
gy ¼ f2ðp, d, rÞ ¼ a1  d þ a2  r þ a3  p (2)
where gy is a rate of growth of GDP per capita, r is the interest rate, d is the budget
deficit, dM is the Maastricht deficit limit, p is the level of inflation, a0, a1, a3>0 and
a2<0 are constant parameters
5. From Equation (1), it follows that the government
would like to keep the rate of economic growth as high as possible, but the level of
the instrument it can employ – the budget deficit – is limited in use by the
Maastricht criteria. Equation (2) implies that the economic growth rate depends not
only on the level of budget deficit but also on the level of the interest rate – the cen-
tral bank policy instrument – and on the level of inflation. A higher level of r affects
growth rate negatively and a higher level of inflation rate is connected with a higher
level of growth rate. Therefore, the decisions made by the government must also take
into consideration the macroeconomic situation (level of inflation) and the decision
of the central bank (level of interest rate).
At the same time, the central bank seeks to keep inflation as close to the target as
possible, minimising the difference between actual inflation and the given target rate6:
FMðÞ ¼ ðpptÞ2 ! min (3)
subject to:
p ¼ f4ðgy, d, rÞ ¼ p0 þ b1  r þ b2  gy þ b3  d (4)
where p0>0 is a base inflation, p
t is the inflation target, b2 and b3>0 and b1<0: The
central bank is in a similar situation as the government; the level of inflation depends
not only on the level of interest rate but also on the economic growth rate and level
of budget deficit.
The above functions allow the non-cooperative model of a fiscal-monetary
game to be solved and, consequently, the Nash Equilibrium for the game.
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3.1. Nash Equilibrium
To determine the reaction functions describing each player’s response to its partner’s
decision and to find the Nash Equilibrium presenting the resulting state of the econ-
omy, let us first solve the interdependent Equations (2) and (4). As a result, the fol-
lowing equations are obtained:
gy ¼ ða1 þ a3b3Þ1 a3b2
 d þ ða2 þ a3b1Þ
1 a3b2






p0 þ ðb1 þ b2a2Þ1 a3b2
 r þ ðb3 þ b2a1Þ
1 a3b2
 d (6)
Solving the equations produces explicit macroeconomic restrictions. Obviously,
1a3b2>0 implies that a3b2<1:
The reaction functions for the government and the central bank are obtained by
maximizing the one-variable function7 (1) with respect to (5) and minimising the
function (3) with respect to (6). The government’s reaction function has the following
form8:
~d ¼ ða2 þ a3b1Þ
a0ð1a3b2Þ2
a1þa3b3  ða1 þ a3b3Þ
   r þ a3
a0ð1a3b2Þ2
a1þa3b3  ða1 þ a3b3Þ





a1þa3b3  ða1 þ a3b3Þ
  dM
(7)
Analogously, the reaction function for the central bank is written as:







p0 b2a1b1 þ b2a2
 d (8)
The Nash Equilibrium is determined by certain sizes of d and r that solve the set
of Equations (7) and (8). In the Nash Equilibrium, the level of d is such that it is the
best response of the government to the best response of the central bank for the
given level of budget deficit. Similar can be written about the level of r; it follows
from the fact that the Nash Equilibrium level of both decision variables is the inter-
section of both reaction functions, which describe the best responses of the given
player to the given decision of the other player. The obtained levels of d and r in the
Nash Equilibrium are given by the following formulas:
d ¼ a1  pt þ a2  p0 þ a3  dM (9)
r ¼ b1  pt þ b2  p0 þ b3  dM (10)
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where:
a1 ¼






 ða1 þ a3b3Þ
 !









 ða1 þ a3b3Þ
 !
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 !
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 !

















 ða1 þ a3b3Þ
 !















 ða1 þ a3b3Þ
 !




As can be seen, the Nash Equilibrium levels in Equations (9) and (10) depend on
pt, p0 and dM (the exogenous parameters). In other words, decisions of the gov-
ernment and the central bank are such that the levels of budget deficit and inter-
est rate in the Nash Equilibrium can be expressed as functions of exogenous
variables, such as the level of inflation target, base inflation and the Maastricht
deficit limit.
The government’s objective function and its limitations considered in this study
comprise, in addition to output, inflation and interest rate, the level of budget deficit
and the Maastricht deficit criterion. As far as the central bank’s objective function
and its limitations are concerned, inflation and the level of budget deficit are supple-
mented by the target inflation rate, interest rate and output. To the authors’ best
knowledge, using these variables to construct objective functions (and their limita-
tions) for the monetary and fiscal authorities is an innovative approach in that it
takes into consideration both economic mechanisms and the mandatory EU legisla-
tion (mainly laws capping budget deficits).
The results of these calculations are consistent with the findings of Engwerda,
van Aarle, and Plasmans (2002), who studied the influence of a fiscal stabilisation
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policy on economic fluctuations in the EMU countries. The main assumption
underlying their model was the ECB’s adoption of a passive (non-strategic) monet-
ary policy to control a common nominal interest rate. Among the limitations of the
model, its focus on open-loop Nash Equilibria and Pareto solutions are noteworthy.
External restrictions (e.g. arising under the Stability and Growth Pact) limit the fis-
cal activity of the government, making the stabilisation of output and prices in the
Euro area less effective and leading to suboptimal macro-economic policy. Dixit
and Lambertini (2000) stressed that if the policy preferences are fixed, then the out-
comes can only be influenced by institutional constraints, changing the fiscal reac-
tion function. Therefore, simple constraints used in the EMU have some desirable
effects, but the design of optimal constraints of fiscal policy remains an interesting
task for the researchers.
In addition, Foresti (2018) added that the degree of commitment to a rule and
discretion, the level of coordination, the order of moves and others issues related to
interaction between monetary and fiscal policies are all significant elements able to
affect the policy mix outcome in the EMU. Lambertini and Rovelli (2004) did not
consider whether or not the individual provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact
are optimal, but they supported the view that discipline must be imposed on the fis-
cal policies designed by EMU member states. Otherwise, inflation may fluctuate too
widely around its target rate, and interest rates may become too volatile. According
to Raguseo and Sebo (2008), fiscal restrictions are not an effective tool against
asymmetric shocks that can impair the performance of EMU economies. It is
empirically known that fiscal restrictions that are not accompanied by full cooper-
ation (a fully centralised budget) are more likely to exert intense pressure on the
central bank.
Similarly, Hughes Hallett et al. (2014) indicated that if the government is too
myopic, it will not be disciplined by the central bank. If in the currency union there
is a moral hazard problem due to free-riding of small member countries, the disci-
plining channel is unlikely to be effective. Therefore, it is necessary in such cases to
discipline fiscal policy in the long term by direct fiscal commitment arrangements
(i.e. legislated and enforceable fiscal policy rules).
3.2. Reaction function analysis
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of the reaction function due to changes in
the deep parameters of the modelled economy (a1, a2, a3, b1, b2 and b3). The reaction
functions presented in the previous subsection (derived from Equations (7) and (8))
are written as:
~d ¼ ~a1  r þ ~a2  p0 þ ~a3  dM (11)
~r ¼ ~b1  pt þ ~b2  p0 þ ~b3  d (12)
where:
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~a1 ¼ ða2 þ a3b1Þ
a0ð1a3b2Þ2
a1 þ a3b3












 ða1 þ a3b3Þ
 !>0
~b1 ¼ ð1a3b2Þb1 þ b2a2
<0
~b2 ¼  1b1 þ b2a2
>0
~b3 ¼  b2a1b1 þ b2a2
>0
Reaction functions (11) and (12) have the following interpretation. For some given
levels of interest rates r, base inflation p0 and the Maastricht deficit limit dM, the gov-
ernment sets the deficit at level ~d: For some given levels of target inflation pt, base
inflation p0 and budget deficit d, the central bank sets interest rates at ~r: Parameters
~a1, ~a2, ~a3, ~b1, ~b2 and ~b3 measure how strongly a given variable influences the optimal
decision of the government or of the central bank. For example, if the target inflation
rate rises, then the central bank’s optimal decision would be to cut interest rates
(because of ~b1<0).
Parameters ~a1, ~a2, ~a3, ~b1, ~b2 and ~b3 are the non-linear combinations of deep param-
eters a0, a1, a2, a3, b1, b2 and b3, which describe the foundations of the analysed
economy (e.g. the reaction of the inflation rate to changes in interest rates, the reac-
tion of the economic growth rate to changes in the inflation rate, etc.). Table 1 shows
the signs of the derivatives of the” tilde” parameters with respect to the deep parame-
ters. A positive sign denoting an increase in a deep parameter (e.g. a1) means that
the value of the” tilde” parameter (~a1) grows too.
The sign of the respective derivative can be interpreted in the following way. Let
us consider two identical economies that only differ in one of the deep parameters,
for example a1. In the economy, when the parameter a1 has a higher value, the par-
ameter ~a1 (which in general is negative, ~a1<0) has a lower absolute value, which
Table 1. Signs of the respective derivatives.
x a0 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3
o~a1
ox < 0 > 0 > 0 ? > 0 > 0 > 0o~a2
ox < 0 < 0 ¼ 0 > 0 ¼ 0 > 0 < 0o~a3
ox > 0 > 0 ¼ 0 > 0 ¼ 0 < 0 > 0o~b1
ox ¼ 0 ¼ 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 ¼ 0o~b2
ox ¼ 0 ¼ 0 > 0 ¼ 0 > 0 < 0 ¼ 0o~b3
ox ¼ 0 > 0 > 0 ¼ 0 > 0 > 0 ¼ 0
Source: own calculations.
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means that it is closer to 0. This means that in an economy where the budget deficit
has a stronger effect on the GDP growth rate (parameter a1 is higher; see Equation
(2)), the government reacts to an increasing interest rate by adopting policy leading
to a higher deficit (see Equation (11)) than in the other economy. Next, when the
interest rate has a stronger effect on the GDP growth rate (parameter a2 is higher,
see Equation (2)) the government reacts to increasing inflation by adopting policy
leading to a higher deficit (see Equation 11) than in the other economy.
In the case of the parameter a2 (interest rates), its positive impact on the optimal
decision of the government (i.e. the level of deficit (o~a1=oa2)). Table 1 shows that the
parameter a2 expresses the positive impact of deficit on the optimal decision of the
government (see Equation (11)) and the negative impact of current inflation on the
optimal decision of the central bank (see Equation (12)). The impact of b3, as well as
a0, is important only for optimal decision making by the government.
Of all 42 derivatives, only one o~a1oa3
 
has an unidentifiable sign determined by val-
ues of unknown parameters. The other 41 derivatives have unambiguous signs (posi-
tive or negative, or derivative takes a value of 0). Table 1 presents them all.
It would be interesting to carry out a similar comparative static sensitivity analysis
of the Nash Equilibrium levels, but the fact that they are determined through the
rivalry between two opposing forces (the government and the central bank) makes it
almost impossible (except in a few specific cases) to conclusively obtain the sign of
similar derivatives in the general case. Given that a change in any of the deep param-
eters has a concurrent effect on the reaction functions and many of the” tilde”
parameters, the final reaction of the Nash Equilibrium is difficult to deduce (to obtain
analytically), but it can be calculated (obtained numerically) assuming certain values
of all parameters.
Conclusions relevant to this study were also presented by Woroniecka-Leciejewicz
(2015), according to whom changes in the central bank and government’s priorities
affect the optimal fiscal and monetary policy responses and consequently the Nash
Equilibrium (equilibrium is a choice of policy mix). When the government wants to
stimulate the rate of economic growth, the optimal budgetary response becomes more
expansionary. The central bank’s optimum monetary strategy becomes more expan-
sionary when it redefines its priorities to accept higher inflation.
Conclusions
This article considers the Nash Equilibrium for the case of a non-cooperative fiscal-
monetary game between the governments and central banks in the EU member states.
Both authorities are assumed to be independent in decision making and to optimally
respond to each other’s best decisions, thus keeping the system in a steady state.
These assumptions were used to construct our original policy-mix model for a non-
cooperative game. The model shows that in the Nash Equilibrium, the level of budget
deficit and the interest rate - being the policy tools of the government and the central
bank, respectively, - depend on exogenous factors such as the inflation target, base
inflation and the Maastricht deficit limit. Therefore, the inflation target rate and the
Maastricht deficit limit, which are set institutionally, are important determinants of
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the fiscal-monetary balance in the EU countries. This paper presents the reaction
functions of the central bank and the government, which are different from those
mentioned in the literature, and based on this, the Nash Equilibrium was calculated
while designing the original equilibrium model for a non-cooperative monetary-fiscal
game in the EU countries.
In this study, with the reaction functions for the government and the central bank,
both authorities’ sensitivity to changes in the deep parameters of economic variables
were also analysed. The sensitivity analysis allows for examination of how strongly
the parameters measuring variables’ influence on the optimal decisions of the govern-
ment and central bank change in response to variations in the deep parameters. It
must be emphasised that the analysis of sensitivity conducted in this paper is an ori-
ginal study, as it was based on the original equilibrium model for a non-cooperative
monetary-fiscal game in the EU countries.
Studies using mathematical policy-mix models to determine the Nash Equilibrium
in a non-cooperative fiscal-monetary game are few, particularly for the case of coun-
tries such as the EU member states, which are subjected to institutional restrictions.
This fact and the community’s progressing economic integration increase the signifi-
cance of this research gain. Its conclusions can also serve as a practical guideline for
decision making by national economic authorities in the EU member states. Based on
the analysis of the game between monetary and fiscal policy in EU countries, some
suggestions have been made to improve the functioning of these policies in the coun-
tries discussed. This study demonstrates that in the Nash Equilibrium, budget deficit
and interest rate depend on the inflation target (which is set by the monetary author-
ities), base inflation and the Maastricht deficit limit (influenced by the economic
authorities of EU countries). It provides the main recommendation for policymakers
to pay attention to these variables when constructing policy.
Notes
1. In our study we propose a model with continuous strategies (i.e., the game that allows
players - the government and the central bank - to choose a specific strategy from a
continuous set of alternatives). This approach is opposite to the discrete strategy, a very
popular approach with a finite set of outcomes and inputs.
2. Deep parameters are thought to be invariant against policy change, and because of the
stability of these parameters, economists use them to evaluate economic policy. The Lucas
(1976) critique suggests that if we want to predict the effect of a policy experiment, we
should model the deep parameters (relating to preferences, technology, and resource
constraints) that are assumed to govern individual behavior, or so-called micro-
foundations.
3. Similar to Kuttner (2002) and Bennett and Loayza (2000).
4. As in Davig and Leeper (2011).
5. a3>0 for simplicity we assume that an inflation rate lower than the inflation target (which
is under the control of the central bank) positively influences the GDP growth. The
literature review informs that high inflation negatively affects the economy (e.g., Barro,
2013). On the other hand, low inflation can positively influence the behaviour of agents
through the impact on their decision. Thus the low inflation can positively influence
economic growth. This phenomenon is also investigated by e.g., Mallik and Chowdhury
(2001) who found a positive relationship between inflation and economic growth. Thus
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the non-linear relationship was found by e.g., Ghosh and Phillips (1998) – in their study
based on 145 countries they found a positive relationship between inflation and economic
growth when inflation is low and negative for high inflation. Due to the fact that inflation
in the euro area is under the control of the ECB (the inflation target is set at the level no
higher than 2%), we adopted a strong assumption of a linear and positive relationship
between economic growth and inflation.
6. See Blinder (1982) and Bennett and Loayza (2000).
7. We skip the details of calculations in the text, but they are available upon request from
the authors.
8. To satisfy sufficient condition:
o2FFðdÞ
od2










Therefore we assume that parameters on the left-hand-side of this inequality are such that
this condition is fulfilled.
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